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MONSANTO LECTURE 
THE COMPLICATED BUSINESS OF STATE 
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS:  AN 
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Michael Heise 
ABSTRACT 
Proponents of judicial elections and related campaign activities emphasize 
existing First Amendment jurisprudence as well as similarities linking publicly-
elected state judges and other publicly-elected state officials. Opponents focus on 
judicial campaign contributions’ corrosive effects, including their potential to 
unduly influence judicial outcomes. Using a comprehensive data set of 2,345 
business-related cases decided by state supreme courts across all fifty states 
between 2010–12, judicial election critics, including Professor Joanna Shepherd, 
emphasize the potential for bias and find that campaign contributions from 
business sources to state supreme court judicial candidates corresponded with 
candidates’ pro-business votes as justices. While Shepherd’s main findings 
generally replicate, additional (and alternative) analyses introduce new findings 
that raise complicating wrinkles for Shepherd’s strong normative claims. 
Findings from this study illustrate that efforts to influence judicial outcomes are 
not the exclusive domain of business interests. That is, judicial campaign 
contributions from non- (and anti-) business interests increase the probability of 
justices’ votes favoring non-business interests. As a result, critiques of judicial 
elections cannot properly rely exclusively on the influence of business interests. 
Moreover, that both business and non-business interests can successfully 
influence judicial outcomes through campaign contributions point in different 
(and possibly conflicting) normative directions. On the one hand, even if one 
agrees that the judicial branch qualitatively differs from the political and executive 
branches in terms of assessing campaign contributions’ proper role, that the 
potential to influence judicial outcomes is available to any interest group (willing 
to invest campaign contributions) complicates popular critiques of judicial 
elections. On the other hand, the same empirical findings also plausibly 
strengthen critiques of judicial elections, especially for those who view the judicial 
domain differently than other political domains. 
                                                
 Professor, Cornell Law School.  This Article is the written version of the Monsanto 
Lecture, delivered at Valparaiso University Law School on February 16, 2017.  Joanna 
Shepherd, Dawn M. Chutkow, Nicole A. Heise, and Nicholas Stephanopoulos provided 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Debates over state judicial selection methods have persisted over time 
and increased in ferocity.1  Questions about how best to reconcile two 
desired goals reside at the core of such debates: judicial independence 
from and accountability to those bound by court rulings. Conventional 
wisdom typically links judicial appointments with enhanced 
independence and judicial elections with enhanced accountability.2  
Among an array of selection methods, many states select their supreme 
court justices through popular election and some have done so since the 
mid-nineteenth century.3  While motivations for those states that use 
popular election as a judicial selection model vary, the motivations 
include a general impulse to increase judges’ accountability to the people 
whom their decisions influence.4 
States opting for judicial elections invariably confront important 
campaign finance questions for judicial candidates.5  As Professor Kritzer 
observes, “[t]he elephant in the room regarding the impact of judicial 
elections on judicial decisions is the question of whether judges who must 
stand for election . . . are influenced by campaign contributions.”6  Legal 
contests over elections and campaign spending have forced the Supreme 
Court to consider the potentially corrosive effects of money in the electoral 
process and, within the bounds of the First Amendment, how concerns 
about corruption might be addressed.7  Similar and concurrent litigation 
over state judicial elections and campaign spending has imposed upon the 
Court derivative questions about whether its concerns about the role of 
money in elections must shift when the elected public official is a judge.8 
                                                
1 See JED H. SHUGERMAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PEOPLE’S COURTS:  PURSUING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012) (discussing 
the history of judicial selection methods within the states). 
2 See id. at 6 (providing a link between judicial appointment and accountability as 
described by Alexis de Tocqueville). 
3 See, e.g., id. at Ch. 3 (giving a helpful summary of the state’s judicial selection process). 
4 Id. 
5 See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Impact of Judicial Elections on Judicial Decisions, 12 ANN. 
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 353, 364 (2016) (showing the impacts of campaign contributions on judicial 
decisions and providing evidence of direct and indirect influences). 
6 Id. 
7 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010) (considering 
concerns about electoral corruption).  See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 104–05, 107–08 
(1976) (striking down campaign expenditure limits). 
8 See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (upholding limits on 
judicial candidates’ ability to personally solicit campaign funds).  See also Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (showing that due process requires recusal when a 
judicial candidate receives contributions in excessive amounts); Republican Party of 
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Even those not particularly bothered in the abstract by submitting 
judicial candidates (along with judges seeking retention) to the electoral 
process understand that the interaction between campaign spending and 
judicial elections heightens potential tensions.9  While early judicial 
elections may have been comparatively inexpensive affairs, judicial 
elections today, by contrast, are frequently quite expensive.10  As a result 
of a transformation of campaign spending and its role in judicial elections, 
“judges spend significant amounts of time and energy raising money.”11  
As judicial campaign spending increased, the number of campaign 
contributors increased which, in turn, increased the probability that an 
elected judge would hear a case involving litigants (or attorneys) who 
contributed to presiding judges’ campaigns.12  How one understands 
these tensions frequently pivots largely on one’s own perspective.  Where 
some see modern trends in judicial elections as “healthy,” others 
increasingly see “nightmarish” problems.13 
These latent tensions frequently emerge in a judicial election context 
that features pro- or anti-business campaign spending invested with an 
eye toward judicial engagement with existing or contemplated tort reform 
legislation. Writing about the 1980s, judicial election scholars noted an 
emergence of a “new-style” of state supreme court campaigns that 
increasingly resembled traditional political campaigns in tone, content, 
and methods.14  These same political scientists noted how judicial 
campaigns began to reach and engage voters on even the “more prosaic 
issues such as tort law.”15  More to the point, “tort reform,” a persistent 
flash-point for pro- and anti-business interests and, consequently, an 
                                                
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (concluding that the announce clause in the 
canon of judicial conduct violates the First Amendment). 
9 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (describing how campaign spending can fuel 
corruption or the appearance of corruption).  See also Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct.  at 1659–60 
(examining how campaign contributions in judicial elections can jeopardize judiciary 
integrity). 
10 See Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 638 (2015) 
(describing the increase in spending on judicial elections). 
11 Id. 
12 See id. (highlighting an example in which two-thirds of the cases heard by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court between 2008–09 had a campaign contributor as the party, 
lawyer, or law firm). 
13 See David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State Judicial 
Selection, 69 ALB. L. REV. 985, 985 (2006) (describing how the future of judicial elections, such 
as in Texas, may be nightmarish considering its increased politicization). 
14 See, e.g., Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, “New Style” Judicial Campaigns and the 
Voters:  Economic Issues and Union Members in Ohio, 45 WEST. POL. QUART. 921, 922 (1992) 
(noting the emergence of the “new style” of judicial elections in which candidates are more 
likely to incorporate policy into their campaigns). 
15 Id. at 944–45. 
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important political issue in many states, is “fought not only in state 
legislatures but also in state supreme courts.”16  Professors Kang and 
Shepherd characterize tort reform issues as business contributors’ 
“primary focus in state judicial races.”17  One predictable consequence in 
states that elect judges is that “much of the money contributed in judicial 
races tends to be given by those interested in the shape of tort law.”18 
While acknowledging that “any interest group might exert influence 
over the judiciary,” Kang and Shepherd’s work focuses on the influence 
of pro-business judicial campaign contributions on judicial votes in 
business cases.19  Professors Kang and Shepherd attribute their focus on 
business’ potential influence on judicial outcomes to the business lobby’s 
unique ability to do so.  This study seeks to broaden Kang and Shepherd’s 
focus by exploring the possible influence of non- (and anti-) business 
contributions as well. 
Whether judicial campaign contributions influence judicial votes and 
case outcomes is, at one crucial level, an empirical question.  In contrast, 
how best to characterize publicly-elected judges and their non-judicial 
elected counterparts is better understood as a normative question. To a 
large degree, how one understands a publicly-elected state judge’s 
function informs one’s assessments about judicial elections and judicial 
campaign spending.  Proponents of judicial elections, such as Professor 
Hall, emphasize the similarities that link elected state supreme court 
justices and other elected officials.20  For critics of judicial elections, 
however, this is precisely the problem.  Specifically, for many judicial 
election critics the similar ways in which campaign spending influences 
judicial, legislative, and executive elected officials contribute to problems 
with judicial elections because of the potentially fundamental ways in 
which the judicial branch differs from the legislative and executive 
branches.21  Consequently, many of the arguments that distinguish 
                                                
16 Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1483, 1488 
(2005). 
17 Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice:  An Empirical 
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 85 (2011). 
18 See Champagne, supra note 16, at 1488 (“[i]t is state judge selection that produces the 
major battles between economic interests that are concerned with a state’s tort law”). 
19 Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 85. 
20 See MELINDA G. HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES:  HOW CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING INFLUENCES 
STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 126 (Stanford University Press, 2015) (discussing how 
studying supreme court elections is essential to understanding the relationship between 
campaign contributions and judicial votes). 
21 See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial Elections, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. 929, 930 (2016) (addressing how the similarities between state supreme court elections 
and elections in other offices are why critics believe a problem exists).  But see James Sample, 
Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth:  Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 
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campaign spending in the judicial and non-judicial electoral contexts 
pivot on distinguishing publicly-elected state judges from other publicly-
elected officials.22 
Even the U.S. Supreme Court appears genuinely conflicted over how 
to frame elected judicial actors in the campaign context.23  On the one 
hand, in striking down a Minnesota law limiting judicial candidates’ 
political speech, the Court implicitly recognized the First Amendment’s 
similar purchase when it came to pure political speech, whether in the 
judicial, legislative, or executive electoral contexts.24  In so doing, the White 
decision in 2002 emphasizes the Court’s implicit recognition of similarities 
between publicly-elected judges and the non-judicial counterparts.25 
In 2015, however, the Court upheld a Florida prohibition on a judicial 
candidate’s direct campaign fundraising solicitations.26  In contrast to the 
White decision, the Williams-Yulee decision suggests that the Court (or at 
least five Justices) views judicial candidates differently than other political 
candidates.27  Specifically, while the White opinion implicitly frames 
judicial candidates as functionally equal to other political candidates for 
purposes of free speech protections, the Williams-Yulee opinion, by 
contrast, takes another tact by endeavoring to distinguish publicly-elected 
state judges from other publicly-elected officials in the campaign 
contributions’ context.28  The Court’s effort to restrict judicial candidates’ 
fundraising in Williams-Yulee rests uneasily with the Court’s prior decision 
in Buckley where it functionally construed campaign contributions and 
spending as core political speech.29  Indeed, critics of the Williams-Yulee 
                                                
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727, 756–57 (2011) (arguing that differences in democratic 
expectations in the courts and traditional political arenas justify treating campaign spending 
in judicial elections differently than in political elections). 
22 See generally Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797 (2002) (Justice 
Stevens dissenting) (describing judges and public officials’ differing roles). 
23 Compare Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) (upholding limits on 
judicial candidates’ ability to personally solicit campaign funds), with White, 536 U.S. at 774 
(explaining that the announce clause in the canon of judicial conduct violates the First 
Amendment). 
24 See White, 536 U.S. at 783–84 (holding that Minnesota cannot prohibit judicial candidates 
from announcing their views on legal and political issues). 
25 See id. at 787–88 (comparing the First Amendment election rights of judges with those 
of their non-judicial counterparts). 
26 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673 (reasoning that when a state has an interest in 
preserving public confidence in the judiciary the state can adopt narrowly tailored 
restrictions to a judicial candidate’s solicitations). 
27 See id. at 1662 (“Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of 
the ballot.”). 
28 See, e.g., id. (holding that the First Amendment does not preclude all restrictions on 
judicial solicitation of campaign funds).  See also White, 536 U.S. at 773 (opining that the 
announce clause is not tailored to serve many interests). 
29 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (striking down campaign expenditure limits). 
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decision quickly noted how the Court’s analysis applies a “heavily 
watered-down version of strict scrutiny analysis”—particularly as it 
relates to the narrowly tailored prong—to enable the Court to reach its 
outcome yet maintain the outward appearance of having applied strict 
judicial scrutiny.30 
At a conceptual level, the contested issues run even deeper.  Whether 
elected state judges are, unlike their elected counterparts in the executive 
and legislative branches, charged with a counter-majoritarian function 
that is structurally threatened by judicial elections resides at the heart of 
what divides judicial election proponents and critics.  Moreover, more 
recent Court decisions imply a growing unease with “protecting the 
integrity of the judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an 
impartial judiciary.”31  As well, the Court wants elected judges to steer 
clear of creating an appearance of impropriety within a constitutional 
regime that permits judicial candidate campaign speech and some forms 
of campaign fundraising.32  Finally, within a context noted for inevitably 
conflicting principles and impulses, it remains unclear whether the divide 
separating judicial election proponents and opponents can be bridged at 
all and, if it can, what role empirical scholarship might play in informing 
arguments.  
Two likely causal pathways help explain relations between judicial 
campaign contributions and judges’ votes that reflect contributors’ 
interests.33  One includes selection bias for the sub-pool of candidates who 
prevail in their judicial elections. Specifically, prevailing judges may 
already possess a preference for (or against) business interests.  Another, 
more subtle, causal mechanism involves judges who, while otherwise 
agnostic about business interests, may favor (or disfavor) business 
interests in their votes with an eye towards securing future campaign 
contributions in future judicial elections. While this study’s data and 
research design are unable to identify which casual pathway might be 
salient, this study can assess whether and, if so, to what degree campaign 
contributions from business and non-business interests correlate with 
judges’ votes in business cases.  
The data set used in this study merges state supreme court decisions 
by 439 state supreme court justices in 2,345 concluded business-related 
cases decided between 2010–12 across all fifty states with information on 
                                                
30 Noah B. Lindell, Comment, Williams-Yulee and the Anomaly of Campaign Finance Law, 
126 YALE L.J. 1577, 1577 (2017). 
31 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
32 See id. at 1664 (explaining that an appearance of impropriety would prompt one to 
question a judge’s impartiality). 
33 See, e.g., Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 72 (discussing the two pathways that 
explain the relationship between judicial campaigns and votes). 
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more than 175,000 contribution records that detail every reported 
contribution to every sitting state supreme court justice in each elected 
state supreme court justice’s most recent election.  Judicial campaign 
contributions to judges were categorized based on their source as 
representing a pro-business, non-business, or anti-business interest.  
The central results from my initial analyses comport with Professor 
Shepherd’s earlier findings about relations between judicial campaign 
contributions from pro-business interests and judges’ pro-business 
votes.34  Additional analyses also identify a new, though related, finding: 
campaign contributions from non- (and anti-) business interests correlate 
with judges’ anti-business votes.  Evidence that non- and anti-business 
interests also correlate with desired judicial votes is important partly 
because it challenges Kang and Shepherd’s critical assumption about 
business contributors’ “unique” abilities when it comes to influencing 
judicial votes.35 
The influence of non- and anti-business campaign contributions on 
judicial votes both challenges and complicates traditional critiques against 
judicial elections that focus on claims about business interests’ undue 
influence.  That is, evidence that business and non-business interests may 
successfully influence judicial outcomes through campaign contributions 
points in different (and possibly conflicting) normative directions.  Even 
if one agrees that the judicial branch qualitatively differs from the political 
and executive branches in terms of assessing campaign contributions’ 
proper role, that the potential to influence judicial outcomes is available 
to potentially any discrete interest group (willing to invest campaign 
contributions) dulls the dominant, business-centric public criticisms of 
judicial elections.  Of course, findings from this study also plausibly 
strengthen critiques of judicial elections overall, especially from those who 
view the judicial domain as distinct from other political domains.  
This Article proceeds in six parts.  Part II briefly maps out the major 
judicial selection models in the United States for federal and state courts, 
as well as the broad legal terrain that structures contests arising out of the 
judicial campaign context.36  Part III summarizes the leading empirical 
work, with particular emphasis on Shepherd’s 2013 paper that this study 
sets out to expand.  The data and methodology are described in Part IV.  
Results are both presented and discussed in Part V.  Part VI concludes.  
                                                
34 See infra Part V.B (comparing results with Shepherd’s earlier model that looked at the 
relations between judicial campaign contributions and judges’ votes). 
35 See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 85 (discussing business groups’ unique ability 
to influence judges). 
36 See infra Part II (discussing judicial election variation and how judicial elections have 
changed over time). 
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II.  JUDICIAL SELECTION AND EVOLVING LEGAL TERRAIN 
While this paper focuses on empirical and normative issues raised by 
campaign contributions in state judicial elections, it remains important to 
note that alternative methods of judicial selection exist.  Equally important 
is that the legal terrain shaping efforts to regulate judicial candidates’ 
conduct and speech, as well as judges’ conduct on the bench, continues to 
evolve over time.  
A. Judicial Selection Variation 
Many state judges are elected to the bench, and the mechanisms used 
by states range from partisan elections to non-partisan retention elections.  
The selection mechanism for Article III judges (and justices) in the federal 
context, by contrast, involves presidential appointment and Senate 
confirmation.37  Once commissioned, federal judges enjoy life tenure, 
subject only to impeachment for conduct that falls below “good 
behavior.”38  By removing federal judges’ appointments from direct 
electoral processes and pressures, the Founders sought to better insulate 
federal judges from the ever-shifting political winds of the day, promote 
independent judgment, and, it is thought (indeed, perhaps even 
assumed), to enhance justice.  
However, appointment-based (or even merit-based) judicial selection 
models are far from immune to criticisms. Despite important differences 
separating elective and appointive judicial models, the role of politics 
persists.  Indeed, President Obama’s effort to promote Judge Garland from 
the appeals court to the U.S. Supreme Court during the president’s final 
year in office and many leading Republican senators’ public declarations 
of their refusal to meet with any appointee so close to a general election 
have only renewed public focus and debate on judicial selection as well as 
politics’ proper role.39  Setting aside separation of powers concerns and 
intra-branch rivalries, such debates imply that questions about the role of 
                                                
37 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2. 
38 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.  See also Edward Lazarus, Life Tenure for Federal Judges:  Should 
It Be Abolished?, CNN (Dec. 10 2004), http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/12/10/ 
lazarus.federal.judges/ [https://perma.cc/F7L9-5QLM] (showing that Americans’ views on 
a judge’s tenure are changing). 
39 See Paul Callan, Paul Callan:  The Best Republican Option?, CNN (Mar. 17, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/16/opinions/merrick-garland-supreme-court-obama-
opinion-roundup/index.html [https://perma.cc/57P8-T5D4] (explaining why the 
Republicans refused to meet with any appointee so close to a presidential election). 
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politics when it comes to selecting judges, even appointed judges, 
persist.40 
It has become received political rhetoric that “unelected” federal 
judges make decisions that inform public life and shape the polity in 
critical ways.  To be sure, direct access to judicial selections by those bound 
by judicial decisions—through direct or retention elections—simply does 
not exist in the federal sphere.  Moreover, one critical constitutional check 
on federal judges, impeachment, has been invoked only rarely and 
typically incident to some of the more egregious cases of judicial 
misconduct.41 
However, citizens are afforded some ability to pick their brand of 
justice through their participation in presidential and congressional 
elections.42  Indeed, with the Robert Bork hearings serving as something 
of a political watershed moment, subsequent presidential political 
campaigns have often featured promises about what kind of judges (and 
justices) the candidate would nominate if elected.43  Similar campaign 
rhetoric is heard in senatorial campaigns as well.  Thus, even in the federal 
judicial space, while perhaps only indirectly, citizens nonetheless possess 
some degree of influence over the selection of judges.  
In addition, empirical assertions about the comparative advantages 
(or disadvantages) of an elected judiciary are advanced too often as if 
counterfactual data do not exist.  How various states select state supreme 
court justices, however, supplies quite helpful, if imperfect, variation.  
While federal judge selection excludes any direct electoral component, 
judge selection methods across the fifty states vary considerably and, 
important to this study, include judicial elections.44 
Scholarly attention to state courts and state judge selection is 
warranted in its own right as more than ninety percent of the nation’s 
                                                
40 See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 125–26 (depicting how politics will always have 
a crucial role in judicial elections). 
41 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 
1475, 1507 (1970) (noting that impeachment is only used in very serious cases involving 
judicial misbehavior). 
42 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 73, 
78 (Yale University Press, Nota Bene ed. 2001) (describing the democratic process and how 
people can elect leaders that reflect their opinions). 
43 See Nina Totenberg, Robert Bork’s Supreme Court Nomination Changed Everything, Maybe 
Forever, NPR (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2012/12/19/ 
167645600/robert-borks-supreme-court-nomination-changed-everything-maybe-forever 
[https://perma.cc/REH2-UDTG] (explaining the partisan divide resulting from Bork’s 
failed Supreme Court nomination). 
44 See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 76–77 (stating that judge selection methods differ 
considerably across the country). 
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judicial work is performed in state courts,45 and approximately ninety 
percent of all state court judges (and state supreme court justices) 
participate in some form of direct electoral activity.46  Insofar as campaign 
contributions remain one form of constitutionally-protected core political 
speech, albeit a regulated one, it is not surprising (indeed, inevitable) that 
state judicial candidates attract campaign funding.  
What might surprise some, however, is how the magnitude of 
campaign spending in state judicial elections has increased over time, 
particularly since the 1980s.47  As Professors Kang and Shepherd note, 
since “money buys things,” questions about what judicial campaign 
contributions might be “purchasing” warrant close attention.48  Various 
threats posed by judicial campaign contributions to the fair administration 
of justice (or even the appearance of fairness) have been considered in 
detail by others.49  After exploring the efficacy of “purchasing” judicial 
outcomes in the state context from an empirical perspective, this Article 
goes on to consider whether the state judicial experience differs in material 
ways from efforts to influence judicial selection in the federal context.  
At this juncture it is important to make clear what this Article does 
not consider.  I take as a given that judicial canons, state rules, norms, etc., 
correctly regulate against any judicial misconduct, which would include 
any judge who bases a legal decision or ruling exclusively in response to 
a judicial campaign contribution.50  Such activity offends any fair-minded 
understanding of what justice might mean.  Moreover, I also assume that 
a well-functioning judicial recusal doctrine, despite its limitations, 
provides one important instrument that can reduce conflicts between a 
judge’s private interests and the administration of impartial justice.  By 
pushing to one side efforts to, quite literally, “purchase” a judge (or a 
judicial outcome) through judicial campaign contributions, I focus instead 
on the empirical and normative contours of the more granular and 
nuanced constituent efforts to “purchase” a judicial philosophy or 
perspective through judicial campaign contributions.  
                                                
45 See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 976 (2001) 
(examining the variety of judicial elections and that most state court judges are elected). 
46 See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1091 
(2007) (app. 2) (stating that “over 90 percent of judges reach the bench by appointment to fill 
vacancies”). 
47 See id. at 1079–80 (describing campaign spending since the 1980’s, which have evolved 
due to changes in advertising techniques). 
48 Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign 
Finance, 86 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (2013). 
49 See, e.g., SHUGERMAN, supra note 1 (showing the different views on judicial contribution 
funding). 
50 See, e.g., id.  (describing the assumptions involved in his analysis). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss1/3
2017] “Buying” Justice 29 
B. Judicial Elections’ Evolving Legal Terrain 
Understanding how the interaction between campaign spending and 
judicial elections heightens potential tensions requires an understanding 
of relevant (and evolving) legal doctrines in this particular context.  The 
relevant doctrines include those relating to the First Amendment and 
campaign speech and spending and, more recently, how judicial 
campaign contributions implicate a judge’s recusal obligations. 
The Supreme Court’s Buckley v. Valeo51 decision in 1976, construing 
political campaign contributions and expenditures as core political speech 
(although allowing for regulations on contributions), continues to wield 
important influence.  In 2002, the Court explored the contours of core 
political speech rights in the judicial electoral context.52  In White, the Court 
struck down a Minnesota Supreme Court canon of judicial conduct that 
prohibited candidates seeking elected judicial office from “announc[ing] 
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues” on First Amendment 
grounds.53 
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia began by noting that strict judicial 
scrutiny was warranted as the Minnesota canon sought a content-based 
speech restriction that implicated the First Amendment’s core.54  While 
conceding the state’s interest in the impartial administration of justice as 
well as in promoting its appearance may well be “compelling,” the Court 
nonetheless concluded that the speech restriction was not sufficiently 
narrowly tailored.55  The Court also noted that the Minnesota judicial 
canon itself separately treated efforts by judicial candidates to announce 
their particular views on legal issues from candidates’ efforts to “pledge 
or promise” to deliver specific judicial outcomes upon election to the 
bench.56  While the White opinion expressly side-steps any resolution 
involving the latter issue,57 the Court’s acknowledgement of it hints at 
deeper and more uncomfortable complexities. 
Nested within the Court’s opinion, however, and expressly engaged 
by the dissenting Justices, is the assumption that “judicial candidates 
should have the same freedom ‘to express themselves on matters of 
                                                
51 See 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (striking down campaign expenditure limits). 
52 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 768, 768 (2002) (analyzing the 
constitutionality of the Minnesota judicial canon’s attempt to prevent judicial candidates 
from announcing their views on certain issues). 
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 774 (stating that the Court of Appeals properly decided that strict scrutiny was 
the proper test to determine the constitutionality of the speech restriction). 
55 See id. at 788. 
56 See id. at 770 (explaining Minnesota’s judicial canon). 
57 See id. (determining that the court “express[ed] no view” on the issue of promising 
particular judicial outcomes). 
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current public importance’ as do all other elected officials.”58  That is, 
while five Justices implicitly refused to analytically distinguish judicial 
candidates from candidates for other publicly-elected offices, at least four 
dissenting Justices advanced such a distinction, noting “the critical 
difference between the work of the judge and the work of other public 
officials.”59  To the dissenting Justices, their impulse that “[j]udges are not 
politicians”60 carried over to those state judges and justices who must 
submit themselves to the political processes and the electorate.  
Having decided that political campaign contributions and spending 
constitute core political speech in Buckley and that state judicial candidates 
were free to engage with contested legal and political issues in White, in 
2009 the Supreme Court was asked to speak directly to some practical 
problems posed by judicial campaign contributions, specifically how an 
elected judge’s campaign contributions implicated recusal obligations.61  
In Caperton, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time Due Process 
concerns arising out of the potential for judicial bias flowing from 
campaign contributions from a litigant appearing before a judge who was 
the recipient of financial support from that litigant.62  While Caperton is 
technically a “recusal” case, the salient facts make clear its relevance to the 
challenges arising out of campaign contributions to judges running for 
election to the bench.   
The key facts in Caperton are both straightforward and compelling.63  
In 1998, Harmon Mining Company successfully sued A.T. Massey Coal 
Company for a contract breach.64  In 2002, A.T. Massey Coal Company 
appealed the $50 million trial court verdict favoring Harmon Mining.65  
Between the trial court decision and a subsequent appeal to West 
Virginia’s Supreme Court, Don Blankenship, Massey Coal Company’s 
CEO, spent $3 million in 2004 to help ensure Brent Benjamin’s election to 
                                                
58 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 768, 797 (2002) (Stevens, J., Souter, J., 
Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 798.  See also id. at 797 (explaining the rationale behind the dissent of the four 
Justices). 
60 See id. at 821 (critiquing the dissent’s reasoning). 
61 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009). 
62 See id. at 889–90 (concluding that application of the Due Process Clause will only be 
confined to rare instances). 
63 See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (Doubleday, 1st ed. 2008) (citing the relationship 
between the book THE APPEAL and the Caperton case).  Indeed, while formally set in a 
fictitious Mississippi town, it is likely that the political and legal controversy surrounding 
the Caperton case provided some inspiration for the 2008 best-selling novel.  Id. 
64 See Chris Dickerson, Caperton-Massey Saga (Mar. 29, 2012), https://wvrecord.com/ 
stories/510601919-caperton-massey-saga [https://perma.cc/74DE-FDKG] (describing the 
procedural history of the Caperton case). 
65 See id. (describing A.T. Massey’s appeal of the $50 million adverse verdict). 
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the West Virginia Supreme Court.66  Four years after his election to the 
West Virginia Supreme Court, Justice Benjamin refused calls for his 
recusal from hearing and participating in A.T. Massey’s appeal.67  Not 
only did he refuse recusal motions, but on two separate occasions Justice 
Benjamin joined a 3-2 majority that ruled in favor of A.T. Massey and 
reversed the original $50 million trial verdict.68  Harmon Mining Company 
then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that Justice Benjamin’s 
participation was improper.  
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Harmon Mining and, writing for 
the Court, Justice Kennedy’s opinion emphasizes the pending litigation 
that coincided with the timing of Blankenship’s significant campaign 
contribution to (now) Justice Benjamin as well as Blakenship’s personal 
financial interest in a favorable disposition of the A. T. Massey case.69  As 
a consequence, Justice Kennedy concluded that, in such a circumstance, 
Justice Benjamin should have recused himself from participating in the 
Massey litigation due to an unacceptable “probability of bias” which 
constituted a threat to the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.70 
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Roberts emphasized the uncertainty that 
necessarily flows from the Court’s departure from two clear situations 
that require a judicial recusal:  “[w]hen the judge has a financial interest 
in the outcome of the case, and when the judge is trying a defendant for 
certain criminal contempts.”71  Justice Roberts voiced deep skepticism 
about judicial efforts to define when a “probability of bias” exists and, if it 
does, what specific probabilistic level warrants judicial recusal.72  To 
underscore his skepticism, Justice Roberts went on to list forty specific 
questions, many salient to the judicial campaign contribution context, 
which, in the minds of four dissenting justices, raise uncertainty about 
whether a judge should recuse under the guidance provided by the 
Court’s Caperton decision.73  Owing to the increased uncertainty 
                                                
66 See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873 (describing Don Blankenship’s campaign contributions to 
Brent Benjamin). 
67 See id. at 873–74 (stating that Benjamin refused to recuse himself because there was no 
information that he would be “anything but fair and impartial”). 
68 See id. at 874–75. 
69 See id. at 886 (addressing the reasons that Justice Benjamin should have recused himself 
from the case). 
70 See id. at 887 (articulating a “probability of bias” recusal standard). 
71 See id. at 890 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
72 See id. at 890–91 (indicating that the “probability of bias” standard is difficult to define 
in a coherent manner, thus making it unclear when recusal is constitutionally required). 
73 See id. at 893–98 (citing a list of questions to consider when determining if recusal is 
necessary). 
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surrounding judicial recusal created by the Caperton decision, Justice 
Roberts predicted a flood of recusal motions.74 
Importantly, the Court’s opinion and the dissents in Caperton 
implicitly assume an empirical relation between campaign contributions 
to judicial candidates and their subsequent votes as judges.  On one level, 
such an assumption makes obvious—indeed, intuitive—sense.75  In the 
political realm, not only is such a relation between campaign contributions 
and political candidates assumed, but is frequently expected, if not 
demanded, by contributors.76 
However, it is also important not to ignore complicating wrinkles in 
Caperton that are far less appreciated because they run against and cloud 
an admittedly compelling public narrative.  While the Caperton litigation 
and events involving Massey Coal and West Virginia Supreme Court 
Justice Benjamin are often pointed to as an “easy” example of all that can 
go wrong with judicial elections, Justice Benjamin’s actual voting record 
on cases involving the Massey Coal Company (and other, related, Massey 
Energy holdings) confounds the received public narrative.77  According to 
a West Virginia Supreme Court press release, prepared by that court’s 
administrative office, during his initial four years on the Court, “Justice 
Benjamin voted against the [legal] interests of Massey Energy or its 
subsidiary 81.6 percent of the time.”78  Before the Caperton litigation, in 
other cases that also involved Massey Coal none of the parties petitioned 
                                                
74 See id. at 902 (warning that the result of the Court’s decision could be a flood of 
litigation).  It warrants note that, thus far, the scholarly consensus is that Chief Justice 
Robert’s prediction of a flood of litigation activity stimulated by Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
in Caperton has been largely unfulfilled.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown:  Judicial 
Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 233 (2010) (stating that there has not been a 
flood of litigation after Caperton). 
75 See id. at 1438 (analyzing the higher likelihood that a Republican judge would cast a 
partisan vote). 
76 See Mark Schmitt, What if You Had as Much Political Influence as a Billionaire?, CNN (Feb. 
16, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/16/opinion/schmitt-politics-money/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/78CT-9CVY] (considering the increased ability of the wealthy to get 
political influence through large campaign donations). 
77 See West Virginia State Supreme Court News, Summary of Chief Justice Benjamin’s 
Dispositive Voting Record Regarding Massey Energy Cases from 01/01/2005 to 12/31/2008 (Mar. 
31, 2009), http://www.courtswv.gov/public-resources/press/releases/2009-releases/ 
march2_09.htm [https://perma.cc/E23F-PAW8] (outlining Justice Benjamin’s voting history 
in Massey cases). 
78 Id.  The analysis of Justice Benjamin’s Massey Energy-related voting record excludes 
votes on such non-dispositive matters as motions for time extensions, exceeding page 
limitations on briefs, etc.  See id. (stating that the list of Justice Benjamin’s voting record on 
cases involving Massey does not include any votes on non-dispositive matters).  See also 
Roland D. Rotunda, Codifying Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 95, 
103 (2010) (explaining Justice Benjamin’s decisions on other cases involving Massey Energy). 
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for Justice Benjamin’s recusal.79  Thus, despite Justice Benjamin’s 
complicated judicial voting record in cases involving Massey Energy (and 
Massey Coal company), the prevailing public narrative surrounding 
Justice Benjamin characterizes him (fairly or not) as having been “bought” 
by Blankenship to serve on the West Virginia Supreme Court on behalf of 
Massey Coal’s interests.80 
A more recent decision in Williams-Yulee further evidences the Court’s 
growing wariness about and unease with practical implications flowing 
from elected judges.81  In Williams-Yulee, the Court upheld Florida’s Code 
of Judicial Conduct which prohibits state judicial candidates from 
personally soliciting campaign funds.82  During her judicial campaign, 
Williams-Yulee sent a mass-mailing fundraising letter to potential 
contributors and then posted her letter to a campaign website.83  Although 
she lost her election, the Florida Bar initiated a disciplinary review, 
concluded that she violated Florida’s Canon of Judicial Ethics, and fined 
Williams-Yulee $1,860.30.84 
Williams-Yulee challenged the Florida Canon of Judicial Ethics’ 
prohibition of a judicial candidate’s direct, personal solicitation of 
campaign funds on First Amendment grounds.  While only a plurality of 
the Justices concluded that Florida’s canon triggered traditional strict 
judicial scrutiny, the Court administered what at least one commentator 
has described as a “heavily watered-down version of strict scrutiny.”85  
Concluding that the canon’s goal of “protecting the integrity of the 
judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an impartial 
judiciary” was, indeed, a compelling interest,86 and that a restriction on 
personal solicitation activities so as to avoid an “appearance of 
                                                
79 See, e.g., U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Helton, 631 S.E.2d 559, 577 (W. Va. 2005) (upholding 
the constitutionality of several coal taxes Massey challenged).  See also Helton v. Reed, 638 
S.E.2d 160, 166 (W. Va. 2006) (reflecting Justice Benjamin’s vote against Massey companies 
at the merits stage). 
80 See Richard Gillespie, Buying a Judicial Seat for Appeal:  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Company, Inc., is Right Out of a John Grisham Novel, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 
309, 315 (2010) (advancing the argument that Justice Benjamin had been “bought” by 
Massey). 
81 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (upholding a Florida 
restriction on campaign contributions in judicial elections). 
82 See id. at 1663 (stating that judicial candidates should not be allowed to personally solicit 
campaign contributions). 
83 See id. (detailing Williams-Yulee’s  solicitation of campaign funds). 
84 See id. at 1663–64 (explaining the application of Florida’s Canon of Judicial Ethics Canon 
7(C)(1) and Williams-Yulee’s fine for violation).  Florida’s Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 
7(C)(1) resembles the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 
85 See Lindell, supra note 30, at 1577 (criticizing the version of scrutiny the Court applied). 
86 Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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impropriety” was narrowly tailored, the Court went on to uphold 
Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1).87 
Setting aside the Court’s specific application of the narrowly tailored 
prong analysis in Williams-Yulee,88 as a descriptive matter it remains 
accurate to note that when the Court applies traditional First Amendment 
doctrine—and the strict scrutiny test in particular—to campaign finance 
restrictions in the context of non-judicial elections, the results are 
complicated and mixed.  For example, when it comes to non-judicial 
candidates’ ability to fundraise or spend their own money, First 
Amendment rights typically prevail, though members of Congress are not 
permitted to solicit funds from their governmental offices.89  Despite this 
palpable trend, in applying these general principles to state judicial 
candidates, the Court departed somewhat from its usual path in Williams-
Yulee.  Notably, the Court appeared to diminish concerns about how 
Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) burdened judicial candidates’ speech rights in an 
almost transparently self-conscious manner.90 
The dissenters in Williams-Yulee rightly pointed out that Florida’s 
Canon 7(C)(1) bans direct candidate financial solicitations in any form and 
to any person.91  That is, the Canon’s prohibition is not necessarily limited 
to only those solicitations likely to create any appearance of impropriety.  
Florida’s ban also applies even where those solicited might never have a 
legal interest in a case decided before the soliciting judicial candidate.92  
Consequently, Williams-Yulee implies that the Court’s concerns about the 
                                                
87 See, e.g., Note, Freedom of Speech—Judicial Campaign Speech—Williams-Yulee v. Florida 
Bar, 129 HARV. L. REV. 231, 232 (2015) (critiquing of the Court’s First Amendment analysis of 
regulations of judicial elections).  Language in Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) resembles language 
in rules for federal appellate judges and justices.  See also Code of Conduct for United States 
Judges, Canon 2 (Mar. 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch02_ 
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW65-3V5W] (“[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety in all activities”). 
88 See 135 S. Ct. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) as “about 
as narrowly tailored as a burlap bag”). 
89 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (expressing that 
a prohibition on corporate expenditure violates the First Amendment).  See also U.S. HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 132–35 (2008), 
https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/documents/2008_House_Ethics_M
anual.pdf [https://perma.cc/82ZD-LX75] [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL] (providing 
that, generally, solicitation of funds from governmental offices is prohibited). 
90 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670 (finding that Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) does not 
burden judicial candidates’ speech rights). 
91 See id. at 1679 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) applies to 
anybody, not just those who could appear in the court). 
92 See id. (explaining that the prohibition of monetary solicitations by a judge applies to 
everyone).  See also id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting) (advising that the prohibition on judicial 
candidates applies even if there is no chance the person will ever have any stake in a case in 
the court). 
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potential for corruption and the appearance of impropriety are palpably 
higher in the judicial context than in the non-judicial context.93 
The Court’s critical—yet implicit—distinction between judicial and 
non-judicial elections presents in at least two critical ways.  First, when it 
comes to a compelling governmental interest, comparing Citizens United 
and Williams-Yulee suggests that for non-judicial candidates the main 
concern pivots on the potential for a quid pro quo while for judicial elections 
the Court appears to worry about the appearance of impropriety and the 
public perception of judicial integrity.94  Second, a similar distinction 
emerges in the Court’s application of the narrowly-tailored requirement.  
The Court has consistently permitted non-judicial candidates to directly 
solicit funds, though not from a candidate’s official governmental office.95  
In Williams-Yulee and the judicial electoral context, by contrast, the Court 
permitted Florida’s total ban of direct fundraising solicitations by judicial 
candidates.  
More fundamentally, however, the Court felt compelled to 
characterize judicial and non-judicial candidates for elected public office 
differently and in ways that triggered different judicial scrutiny over 
campaign finance issues.96  In an effort to climb out from under its earlier 
decision in Citizens United, the majority in Williams-Yulee took great pains 
to argue that judicial and non-judicial candidates are expected to act and 
campaign differently.97  The Court’s decisions simply assert that states 
have a broader interest in preserving the appearance of judicial integrity 
than in preserving a similar appearance for those seeking legislative and 
executive offices.98 
III.  PRIOR EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP 
This study builds on and extends prior scholarship by Professors 
Kang and Shepherd which used an earlier (1995–98) state supreme court 
                                                
93 See Case Comment, Williams-Yulee and the Anomaly of Campaign Finance Law, 126 YALE 
L.J. 1577, 1585 (2017) (“[s]tates have a broader interest in preserving the appearance of 
judicial integrity than in preventing the appearance of legislative and executive corruption”). 
94 Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010) (explaining 
that the goal of contribution limits is preventing quid pro quo corruption), with Williams-Yulee, 
135 S. Ct. at 1673 (stating that there is a compelling interest in preserving judicial integrity). 
95 See, e.g., HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 89, at 132 (discussing the inability of 
politicians to solicit funds from governmental offices). 
96 See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[s]ince judges should be 
accorded special respect and dignity, their election can be subject to certain content-based 
rules that would be unacceptable in other elections”). 
97 See id. at 1667 (discussing how the state’s interest is different in judicial campaigns as 
opposed to legislative and executive campaigns). 
98 See id. (stating that because the roles of judges and politicians differ, legal rules 
regulating their respective campaigns should also differ). 
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data set.99  Their earlier work found strong relations between the 
probability of an elected state supreme court justice’s pro-business vote 
and the amount (and proportion) of campaign contributions that these 
justices received from pro-business interests.100 
Kang and Shepherd’s findings in the business litigation context 
generally comport with analogous empirical work focusing on other 
litigation sectors.  Professor Shepherd has also found that interest group 
judicial campaign contributions increase “the probability that judges will 
vote for the litigants favored by those interest groups.”101  In addition, an 
array of smaller-scale studies of individual states note relations between 
lawyers’ campaign contributions and case outcomes when those lawyers 
(or the lawyers’ interests) appear in court.102 
Professor Shepherd’s more recent empirical work focusing on the 
potential influence wielded by pro-business interests through judicial 
campaign contributions to state supreme court justices reinforces 
important—and uncomfortable—questions.103  Examining business-
related cases decided by state supreme courts from 2010–12, Professor 
Shepherd’s 2013 report, “Justice At Risk,” similar to her prior work, finds 
“a significant relationship between business group contributions to state 
supreme court justices and the voting of those justices in cases involving 
business matters.”104  Fueled by her empirical findings, Shepherd’s 
normative perspective on the issue is clear when she characterizes 
campaign contributions’ role in judicial elections as “destructive.”105  
                                                
99 See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 72 (analyzing new data that builds on data 
collected from 1995–1998). 
100 See id. at 73 (finding that as judicial campaign contributions from big businesses 
increased, so too did the likelihood that judges will find for business litigants). 
101 Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 669–72 & 
tbls. 7 & 8 (2009). 
102 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions:  A Case Study of Arbitration 
Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 661 (1999) (noting the influence of plaintiff and defense 
lawyers’ contributions and favorable arbitration rulings by the Alabama Supreme Court); 
Eric N. Waltenburg & Charles S. Lopeman, Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars, 28 SE. POL. 
REV. 241, 24 (2000) (explaining the influence of plaintiff and defense lawyers’ contributions 
and favorable torts cases in Ohio, Alabama, and Kentucky); Madhavi McCall, The Politics of 
Judicial Elections:  The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the Voting Patterns of Texas 
Supreme Court Justices, 1994-1997, 31 POL. & POL’Y 314, 315, 330 (2003) (finding that business-
related judicial campaign contributions influenced case outcomes in the Texas Supreme 
Court). 
103 See JOANNA SHEPHERD, JUSTICE AT RISK:  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 1 (AM. CONST. SOC’Y. FOR L. & POL’Y, June 2013), 
https://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_13.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ZX72-V5CT] (confirming a strong relationship between campaign 
contributions from businesses and state supreme court justice voting). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 2. 
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While Shepherd’s recent brief report represents another important 
contribution to the literature, her analyses also open an array of additional 
research questions.  This Article examines one of the research questions 
prompted by Shepherd’s report. 
Shepherd’s 2013 report contributes to, and builds on, a nascent—
through growing—empirical literature that endeavors to assess and 
model judicial outcomes.106  As I discuss more fully below, core findings 
from Shepherd’s 2013 study stood up well to replication efforts as well as 
most of her alternative model specifications.  Setting aside one’s priors 
about how to best reconcile constitutionally-protected core political 
speech, judicial campaign contributions, and the various selection 
mechanisms states employ for judges and justices, Shepherd’s (and that of 
others) broad critique advanced against business interests’ participation 
in judicial elections—even if empirically accurate—may either go too far 
or, paradoxically, not far enough.  And only after deeper empirical 
exploration do the more abstract principles fall out of comparatively easy 
focus and nettlesome granularity and complicating wrinkles emerge.  
Moreover, despite its contributions, a few factors, notably the 
potential for measurement error, limit the strength of Shepherd’s 2013 
findings.  The data set (described more fully below) includes state 
supreme court decisions reached between 2010–12 and in states where 
state supreme court justices were elected in some manner (i.e., retention, 
partisan, or non-partisan elections).107  The data set leverages the justices’ 
political party affiliation as a proxy (albeit imperfect) for judicial ideology.  
As Professor Kritzer observes, however, those state supreme court justices 
that confronted partisan elections before 2010 include those from southern 
states where “at least some of these justices were business-oriented 
Democrats.”108  As such, the specter of measurement error lurks.  
Any data set limitations notwithstanding, because my study extends 
Shepherd’s 2013 report and data set, it is particularly important to note 
how my study differs.  From the perspective of research design, 
Shepherd’s focus on business cases (specifically business cases that 
reached state supreme courts between 2010 and 2012 which involved a 
business and a non-business litigant) makes good and obvious sense.  
After all, efforts to distill judicial outcomes require careful strategies to 
“keep all else constant,” or at least as much as possible.  Despite important 
variation within “business litigation,” a focus on business litigation helps 
                                                
106 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 102 (providing various legal scholarship regarding 
state judicial elections). 
107 See infra Part IV (describing the data and variables used to extend prior work on judicial 
campaign funding). 
108 Kritzer, supra note 5, at 366. 
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rein in the sometimes tremendously complicating variation that exists 
across various cases, types, and litigating parties.  Filtering the data set 
further to include only cases involving a business and a non-business 
litigant facilitates efforts to distill each individual justice’s vote as either 
pro- or anti-business.  The distillation of judicial votes to either a pro-
business or anti-business characterization is particularly helpful for 
broader generalizations of the tort reform context that are frequently 
dominated by pro-business (or Chamber of Commerce) and anti-business 
(frequently union) interests.  
Indeed, Shepherd’s careful attention to research design only enhances 
a reader’s confidence in her results.  Building on their observation that 
“[a]lthough any interest group might exert influence over the judiciary, 
business groups may be unique in their ability to do so,”109 Professors 
Kang and Shepherd’s existing work focuses on pro-business 
contributions’ potential influence.  According to Kang and Shepherd, 
business contributors’ “substantial resources,” more focused political and 
legal agenda, and greater “stake” in the outcome of judicial elections is 
what distinguishes them from non-business contributors.110 
While Shepherd’s data set is certainly well-suited to (and, indeed, 
designed for) her focus on pro-business interests’ potential influence on 
judicial outcomes through campaign contributions, the data set also 
permits—even invites—further related exploration in two important 
ways.  First, the data set includes information on each justice’s campaign 
contributions from business interests as well as the total amount of each 
justice’s campaign contributions.  As such, simple data manipulations 
generated information on each justice’s non-business campaign 
contributions.  While each justice’s non-business campaign contributions 
certainly warrant exploration, the nature of the non-business campaign 
contributions precludes strong generalizations.  The interpretative 
limitations and ambiguity flow from the composition of the non-business 
contributions.  Sources of non-business judicial campaign contributions 
range from a judicial candidate’s own personal contributions to those 
from, for example, labor unions.  While limiting my characterization of 
this sub-pool of campaign contributions as merely non-business may 
reflect over-caution, the varied and wide-ranging sources of funds that 
                                                
109 Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 85. 
110 See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 85 (explaining that business groups may be 
unique in their ability to exert power over the judiciary due to their substantial resources 
and the great deal they have at stake in their support of judicial candidates). 
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compose non-business contributions preclude a stronger 
characterization.111 
Second, while the non-business sub-pool of campaign contributions 
may be inherently ambiguous, the data set also identifies and codes those 
non-business contributions from labor unions and democratic political 
party committees.112  Contributions from these two sources are far less 
ambiguous and are more plausibly characterized as anti-business.  After 
all, labor unions enjoy a robust history opposing management and 
Shepherd’s paper exploits a judge’s political party as an ideological 
control variable signaling a judge’s posture to business interests.113  
Separate analyses focusing on the sub-pool of anti-business campaign 
contributions not only permits a stronger characterization of the nature of 
such contributions, but they also serve as a robustness check on the more 
general non-business findings.  
In addition to expanding Shepherd’s work by exploring alternative 
dependent variables, my models depart in a few (albeit minor) technical 
ways from Shepherd’s models.  First, while Shepherd’s main model 
construes business contributions in terms of their raw total as well as in 
terms of a percentage of total judicial campaign contributions, my 
analyses focus only on business (and non-business and anti-business) 
contributions as a percentage of total campaign contributions.  Second, 
because the political science and empirical legal literatures on judicial 
decision-making typically include a measure of how much time remains 
on a judge’s (or a governor’s) elected term when a decision was reached, 
my models include a dummy variable signaling whenever a justice voted 
on a case with two or fewer years remaining on her elected term to the 
bench. 
Third, Shepherd’s models include dummy variables identifying 
democrat and republican justices.  The reference group in Shepherd’s 
report, for interpretative purposes, involves those justices whose political 
affiliation was either missing or coded for something other than democrat 
                                                
111 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 22 n.64 (noting that the non-business contributions 
include those from “interests often opposed to business,” and that Shepherd felt that 
reflexively construing all non-business contributions as anti-business, invited measurement 
error). 
112 See id. at 1 (presenting general information on the manner data was gathered that 
included gathering data on all contributions made, which would include labor union 
contributions and contributions from democratic political party committees). 
113 See, e.g., Melvyn Dubofsky, AMERICAN LABOR SINCE THE NEW DEAL 59–60, 62 (Melvyn 
Dubofsky, 1971) (showing one perspective on labor unions’ uneasy relation with 
management over time).  See also Thomas B. Edsall, Republicans Sure Love to Hate Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/republicans-sure-
love-to-hate-unions.html?mcubz=0 [http://perma.cc/U2HV-GT65] (providing an essay 
exploring labor unions’ traditional political support for democrats). 
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or republican.  As I describe in greater detail below, my models include 
only one dummy variable identifying either democrat or republican 
justices.114  (Alternative specifications include dummy variables for 
“democrat” and “republican,” respectively.)  In this way, my model 
specifications consciously “stack-the-deck” against the potential salience 
of a justice’s political affiliation.  Thus, where a justice’s political affiliation 
achieves statistical significance, my coding decisions should increase 
readers’ confidence in the finding.  As I describe below, however, my 
coding decisions also contributed to some political salience results that 
depart slightly from Shepherd’s earlier results. 
IV.  DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
To test the possible influence of campaign contributions from pro-, 
non-, and anti-business sources on state supreme court justices’ votes in 
cases where one of the litigating parties is a business interest, I use a data 
set constructed by Professor Shepherd that itself is the product of four 
discrete data sets, each briefly described below.115  First, a team of 
independent researchers from Emory University School of Law collected 
and coded state supreme court decisions (N=30,355) between 2010 and 
2012 and across all fifty states.116  A sub-set of this data set, 21,105 entries 
(69.5%), involved cases where the identified business interest was on 
one—and only one—side of the litigation. This filtering was necessary for 
research design purposes as outcomes in these cases facilitate an 
assessment of the degree to which, if any, business campaign 
contributions may have informed justices’ votes in business-related cases.  
For each case, the researchers coded whether each participating justice, 
sitting as a member of a multi-judge appellate panel, cast either a pro- or 
anti-business vote in a case.  
A second data set includes information on the more than 175,000 
contribution records that detail every reported contribution to every 
sitting state supreme court justice between 2010–12 in each elected state 
supreme court justice’s most recent election.  These data were collected by 
the National Institute on Money in State Politics (“Institute”), a non-
partisan, nonprofit charitable organization that focuses on data gathering 
on campaign finance activity in all fifty states.  The Institute obtains the 
campaign finance data in either electronic or paper form from state 
disclosure agencies.  The Institute assigned each donor an economic 
                                                
114 See infra Part IV. 
115 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 10 (outlining the four discrete data sets that were 
compiled by Professor Shepherd). 
116 See id. at 1 (describing the independent team’s data gathering of court decisions from 
all fifty states between 2010 and 2012). 
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interest code determined by information included in the disclosure 
reports as well as deeper independent research into the donor’s economic 
background and interests.  From the Institute data, campaign contribution 
data for all judges in the sample data who were candidates in both 
partisan and nonpartisan state supreme court races were computed. 
A third data set includes political party affiliations (if any) for each of 
the 439 state supreme court justices and a fourth contains state-specific 
information on how each state selects and retains its supreme court 
justices.  Once merged, the final data set includes justice-level information 
on 439 state supreme court justices who participated in 2,345 concluded 
business-related cases, every justice’s vote in each case, along with an 
array of contextual and background information (on the justice, campaign 
contributions, case, court, and state) that might help explain a justice’s 
vote. 
A. Description of Key Variables 
The following key variables explore the relation between justices’ 
votes favoring a business litigant and judicial campaign contributions 
from business and non-business interests. To better isolate the 
independent influence of campaign contributions, the models include an 
array of standard control variables. 
1. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable signaling when a justice 
voted in favor of the business litigant.  A judicial vote is coded as pro-
business if the end result favored or advantaged the business litigant, 
regardless of whether the actual judge vote took the form of a reversal, 
affirmance, or damage award alteration.  In model specifications that 
explore the influence of non- and anti-business campaign contributions, 
the dependent variable signals when a justice voted in favor on the non-
business litigant.117 
2. Key Independent Variables of Interest 
The key independent variables of interest include judicial campaign 
contributions from pro-, non-, and anti-business interests.  While an exact 
measure of a pro-business interest eludes, I followed Shepherd’s coding 
convention and defined pro-business interests’ campaign contributions to 
include those from agriculture, communications, construction, defense, 
                                                
117 See id. at 12 (presenting an explanation for what the dependent variable in the analysis 
examining the biasing effects of judicial campaign contributions on judicial decisions). 
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energy, finance and real estate, and general business sources.118  Non-
business contributions were computed to include all financial 
contributions that came from sources other than those identified as a pro-
business source.119  Finally, anti-business contributions, a sub-pool of the 
non-business contributions, include only those contributions from either 
labor unions or democratic party political committees.120 
Insofar as the raw total amount of judicial campaign contributions 
from pro-, non-, and anti-business sources varied across judges, along 
with variation in a justice’s total campaign contributions, all pro-, non-, 
and anti-business judicial campaign contributions are expressed as a 
percentage of each justice’s total campaign contributions.  As Professor 
Shepherd notes, “[t]his is likely a more accurate measure of business 
influence [on a particular justice] because the impact of a contribution 
likely depends on its importance relative to other contributions.”121 
While the pro-, non-, and anti-business contributions are expressed as 
a percentage of each justice’s total amount of campaign contributions, to 
get a better sense as to their relative contribution, the magnitude of a 
justice’s campaign contributions also warrants attention.  Accordingly, all 
of the model specifications include a variable reflecting the raw total of 
each justice’s campaign contributions.  Finally, all judicial campaign 
contributions are expressed as natural logs. 
3. Control Variables 
All model specifications include various control variables at the case, 
justice, and state levels.  In addition, because the outcome of individual 
cases within a state or by the same justice might not include the necessary 
independence from one another, case outcomes are clustered at the state- 
and individual-justice levels.  
                                                
118 See id. at 10 (explaining that for robustness purposes, and to tether this work with prior, 
related work, alternative supplemental specifications considered a narrower definition of 
“pro-business interests” that included only business-related contributions from finance and 
real estate, “general” business, and health industry sources).  See, e.g., Kang & Shepherd, 
supra note 48, at 1271 (showing that prior literature defines a narrower definition of business 
interests as those aligning with “conservative” interests and agenda).  Id. at 1270 n.129 
(discussing that unpublished results from these alternative specifications are generally 
consistent with a broader definition of pro-business contributions). 
119 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 12 (noting that non-business contributions equaled 
total contributions minus pro-business contributions). 
120 See infra note 121 and accompanying text (describing the composition of anti-business 
contributions). 
121 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 10–12.  Nonetheless, as a robustness check, I re-ran in 
supplemental analyses (unreported) models whose results are presented in tbls.1–3.  See also 
infra Tables 1–3 (substituting raw totals for percentages as a measure of business 
contributions to judicial campaigns did not materially affect the substantive results). 
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While cases in this study are limited to business litigation (signaled by 
the presence of a business litigant), important variation can exist within 
business cases.  A case’s underlying legal merits, to some degree, inform 
a justice’s vote and the legal strength of business cases can vary.  In this 
context, it is possible that some of the business cases heard by state 
supreme courts were either so strong or weak on the legal merits that 
justices voted for (or against) the business interest independent of any 
campaign contributions received from pro-, non-, or anti-business 
interests or the justices’ ideological preferences (signaled by a judge’s 
political party affiliation or, if none existed, by imputing to a judge an 
appointing governor’s political party).122 
How to measure a case’s underlying legal strength, however, remains 
contested.  By definition, every case in this study persisted through a trial 
and, in most states, some level of intermediate appellate review before it 
reached a state supreme court for resolution.  Presumably, and consistent 
with case selection theory, cases whose underlying legal merits that 
strongly tilt in either direction (either pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant) 
would likely have succumbed to settlement pressures rather than 
persisting through state supreme court review.  While Priest-Klein theory 
implies that only cases where some degree of objective uncertainty exists 
about a case’s outcome would persist to a state supreme court for 
disposition (and, if so, this would result in win rates that approximate fifty 
percent), empirical work makes clear how important variation exists in 
terms of observed win rates across case types.123  What is equally clear, 
however, is that some of the assumptions underneath the Priest-Klein 
prediction, including asymmetric information, similar stakes invested by 
both parties to a lawsuit, and accurate ex ante assessments about a case’s 
underlying legal merits, do not hold with the precision that theory might 
imply.124 
In an effort to control the underlying legal strength of the cases 
(however imperfectly), I incorporate the clever case strength variable 
crafted by Professor Shepherd.  In constructing a measure of case strength, 
Professor Shepherd initially estimated a model without a case strength 
variable to assess the most likely number of pro-business votes for the 
                                                
122 See id. at 14 (noting that despite business contributions, judges can also vote owing to 
their political beliefs).  See also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology:  Public 
and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 743, 745 (2005) 
(discussing the robustness of political party as a proxy for a judge’s ideological preferences). 
123 See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes For Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984). See also Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, & Daniel Klerman, The Priest-Klein Hypothesis:  
Proofs and Generality, 48 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 59, 65 (2016) (highlighting the Priest-Klein’s 
hypothesis of case variations and outcomes). 
124 See Lee & Klerman, supra note 123, at 70. 
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state justices hearing the case.  The estimated number of pro-business 
votes exploits information on each justice’s political party affiliation.  
Backing-out the actual number of pro-business judicial votes observed in 
a case from the number of estimated pro-business judicial votes provides 
a sense of the underlying strength of the case’s legal merits. 
To illustrate, consider a model estimation predicting that five of the 
seven state justices would vote in favor of the business interest.  If in the 
actual case six of the seven justices voted in favor of the business interest, 
the value of the case strength variable in this case would be positive 
suggesting that the underlying legal strength of the case is stronger than 
predicted.  If, in contrast, only two of the seven justices voted in favor of 
the business interest, the case strength variable would be negative, 
indicating a comparatively weaker case on the legal merits.  By computing 
the difference (if any) between the predicted (modeled) number of pro-
business votes and the observed number of pro-business votes in each 
case generates a case strength variable, which provides some insight into 
a case’s underlying legal strength that will influence judicial outcomes 
intendent of judicial campaign contributions from business interests.  The 
inclusion of the case strength variable as a control is designed to help 
isolate the potential unique influence of campaign contributions from 
pro-, non-, and anti-business interests on justices’ decisions in business 
cases.  
To further address possible selection effect influences, a final case-
level control variable signals when the petitioner was the business litigant 
(in the pro-business model) and the non-business litigant (for the non- and 
anti-business models).  At the individual justice-level, Professor 
Shepherd’s 2013 analysis includes dummy variables for both republican 
and democratic justices as a (imperfect) proxy for judicial ideology.125  
Consequently, for interpretative purposes, the appropriate reference for 
each political party dummy variable is the comparatively smallest group 
of justices (almost twelve percent) who are either a member of a political 
party other than republican or democrat or, in contrast, are those for 
whom information on their political affiliation is missing. 
My analyses, by contrast, reflect a slightly different coding decision 
on how best to treat judges whose political affiliation is either unknown, 
missing, or something other than republican or democrat.  By including in 
my models only one dummy variable for a justice’s political affiliation 
(republican or democrat), my model facilitates a more intuitive reference 
point (e.g., republican justices as compared to all other justices who are not 
republican).  Moreover, such a coding strategy is also structurally more 
                                                
125 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 12 (describing Shepherd’s use of political party 
affiliation to signal judicial ideology). 
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conservative insofar as it treats all unknowns as something other than 
what the coefficient captures.126  Insofar as my coding convention is 
structured to mute the attribute I assess, where a justice’s political 
affiliation variable achieves statistical significance, confidence about its 
actual influence should increase. 
Finally, Shepherd’s models omit any information on how much time 
remains in a justice’s elected term when she voted in a case.127  Political 
science literature on judicial outcomes emphasizes how judicial conduct 
may be influenced as justices approach electoral events, particularly in the 
criminal law domain.128  As a result, my model includes a dummy variable 
that signals when a judge voted in a case within two years of the end of a 
judicial term. 
The models also include an array of state-level controls, beginning 
with variables signaling whether a state’s method of judicial elections 
were partisan or non-partisan contests.129  As well, in states where the 
existing legal climate is business-friendly, one might reasonably expect 
more judicial votes favoring business interests regardless of a judge’s 
business-related judicial campaign contributions.  To better isolate the 
potential influence of campaign contributions from a state’s overall 
business legal climate, the models include a tort liability index, 
constructed by the Pacific Research Institute.130  Finally, as judicial votes 
in business-related cases may also reflect public preferences or ideological 
trends, the models include a traditional and well-known measure of a 
state’s ideological preference.131 
                                                
126  Cf. Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets. 
127 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 17–20 (noting that Shepherd’s models do not take into 
account how much time is left on a judge’s elected term). 
128 See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty:  
The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates’ Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 941, 941–43 (1994) (detailing pressures generated by prosecutors’ electioneering). See 
also Ronald J. Tabak, Commentary, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and 
Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 280, 280–81 (1994) 
(describing the perceived political pressures associated with death penalty decisions); 
Michael Heise, The Death of Death Row Clemency and the Evolving Politics of Unequal Grace, 66 
ALA. L. REV. 949, 980–81 (2015) (assessing the influence of reelection cycles on clemency 
grants for death row inmates). 
129 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 11. 
130 See Lawrence J. McQuillan & Hovannes Abramyan, U.S. Tort Liability Index, 2010 Report, 
PAC. RES. INST., http://www.civiljusticenj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/2010_Tort_ 
Liability_Index.pdf [https://perma.cc/V225-8FLD] (noting that the index uses data 
available as of Oct. 1, 2009). 
131 See William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in American States, 
1960-93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 327 (1998) (showing that the index uses updated data through 
2008). 
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B. Methodology and Research Design 
The cases in this study are limited in two important ways.  First, the 
data include civil litigation where a business interest was on one, and only 
one, side of the litigation.132  Limiting the data set in this way facilitates 
characterizing each justice’s vote as either pro-business or not pro-
business.  Second, the analyses include only those states where state 
supreme court justices are elected in some manner (i.e., retention, partisan, 
or non-partisan elections).  While not all state supreme court justices 
confront some form of election, as Figure 1 (below) makes clear, judicial 
campaign contributions do not exist where judicial elections do not exist.  
While collapsing the three major forms of judicial elections might invite 
criticism, Figure 1 illustrates that even judicial retention elections attract 
some level of campaign contributions (though far less than non-partisan 
and partisan judicial elections).  Potential criticism aside, including all 
forms of judicial elections is necessary to tether this study to prior 
empirical work in this field.133 
V.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Empirical results—both descriptive and more granular regression 
models—help explain various influences on state supreme court justices’ 
votes in business cases.134 
A. Descriptive Results 
How states structure judicial elections influences business 
contributions to judicial campaigns.135  Figure 1 illustrates how business 
contributions to judicial campaigns distribute across the four major 
judicial selection mechanisms.  As one would expect, in states where 
supreme court justices are appointed rather than elected, justices received 
no business-related contributions.  Where elections select state supreme 
court justices, by contrast, business interests participate in those 
campaigns partly through financial contributions.  The percentage of 
business-related contributions varies among the three major judicial 
election forms—retention, nonpartisan, and partisan.  Again, consistent 
with common sense, Figure 1 illustrates that the percentage of business-
                                                
132 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 11 (describing Shepherd’s research design). 
133 See id. at 4 (establishing that the study looked at several types of election processes, 
which allowed for a more complete and extensive study).  
134 See id. at 12 (explaining that granular regression models are useful in studies of 
influence on judges). 
135 See id. at 13 (discussing how state constructions of judicial retention can influence how 
judges receive business contribution). 
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related judicial campaign contributions were at their highest in partisan 
judicial elections and lowest in retention elections. 
 
Figure 1:  Distribution of Pro-Business Contributions (%) Across 
Various Methods of State Supreme Court Justice Selection 
SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets. 
 
One important way this Article expands on Shepherd’s 2013 analysis 
is by including judicial campaign contributions from non-business 
interests.  Consequently, it is important to view business and non-business 
contributions in relation to one another. Figure 2 presents kernel density 
estimates of the distributions of (logged) business and non-business 
campaign contributions as a percentage of total campaign contributions 
and the line patterns inform.  Specifically, the overall visual impression is 
one of an “X,” with the business and non-business lines intersecting just 
past the fifty percent point.  That is, the business and non-business lines 
essentially reflect one another.  Of course, given the somewhat reciprocal 
nature of the coding protocols for the business and non-business 
contribution variables, the visual pattern emerging in Figure 2 does not 
surprise.  While Figure 2 does reveal some degree of overlap (that is, some 
justices received campaign contributions from both business and non-
business sources), the overall impression is one of separation.  That is, 
most judicial candidates received the bulk of their campaign contributions 
from either business or non-business interests. 
 
0
50
10
0
0
50
10
0
0 50 100 0 50 100
No Election Retention Election
Nonpartisan Election Partisan Election
Percent of Contributions from Business
Heise: The Complicated Business of State Supreme Court Elections: An Emp
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017
48 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
Figure 2:  Kernel density estimates, pro-business and non-business 
contributions 
SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets. 
B. Regression Results 
While the descriptive results comport with intuitive notions about the 
relation between judicial selection methods and business campaign 
contributions in judicial elections, as well as between business and non-
business judicial campaign contribution trends, more nuanced regression 
analyses are necessary to isolate and identify possible relations between 
business (and non-business) contributions and judicial votes in business 
cases. 
1. Pro-Business Judicial Campaign Contributions 
Table 1 presents results from the mixed effects models on business 
campaign contributions’ influence on judge votes in business cases.  As it 
relates to the key variable of interest—campaign contributions from 
business interests (expressed as a percentage of a justice’s total campaign 
receipts)—results in Table 1 make clear that as the percentage of a justice’s 
campaign contributions from pro-business interests increased, so too did 
the likelihood of the justice voting in a manner that favors the business 
litigant.  Interestingly, at the same time, an increase in total campaign 
contributions corresponds with a reduction in the likelihood of a justice 
casting a pro-business vote.  Among the various types of judicial election 
mechanisms, partisan elections were more likely to generate justices who 
0
.01
.02
.03
.04
0 20 40 60 80 100
(log) campaign contributions as a percentage of total contributions
Business
Non-Business
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 [2017], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss1/3
2017] “Buying” Justice 49 
cast pro-business votes.  Justices’ ideology (expressed through political 
party affiliation) also achieves statistical significance and it does so in the 
expected directions.  That is, while republican justices were more 
favorable to business litigants, democratic justices were systematically less 
favorable (Table 1, columns A and B, respectively).  A state’s tort climate, 
another important control variable, also achieves statistical significance in 
the expected direction; an increase in a state’s liability index corresponds 
with a decreased likelihood of a pro-business judicial outcome.  Finally, 
case strength also proved important.  As a business case’s underlying legal 
strength increased, so too did the likelihood of a justice vote in favor of the 
business interest. 
Notably, when the business interest was the petitioner, the likelihood 
of a pro-business outcome decreased.  Interestingly, a similar finding 
emerges in both non-business models as well.   That the petitioner status 
variable’s association with decreasing the probability of a favorable judge 
vote cuts across the business/non-business divide implies that what it 
signals may have little to do with the business (or non-business) context.  
While these data and models do not address this particular question, it 
remains possible that these findings reflect a “pro-affirmance” bias at the 
state supreme court level.  Setting aside selection effects’ important 
influences on appellate reversal rates as well as variations across case 
types, prior work on various civil appellate contexts (including state and 
federal) implies an overall impression of the comparative difficulty that 
petitioners confront when seeking to overturn a lower court decision.136  
Thus, the finding in Table 1 suggesting that business petitioners reduce 
the probability of a judge voting in favor of the business litigant needs to 
be understood within an appellate context that, on balance, displays a 
general tilt toward respondents independent of the business litigation 
context. 
 
 
                                                
136 See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts Redux? An 
Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 100, 110 (2015), 
tbl.1 (summarizing state and federal civil appeals reversal rates). 
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TABLE 1: MIXED EFFECTS MODEL OF PRO-BUSINESS JUDICIAL 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS’ INFLUENCE ON JUDICIAL VOTING IN 
BUSINESS CASES (2010-2012) 
 
Judge vote favoring business litigant: 
(A) 
 
 
(s.e.) 
(B) 
 
 
(s.e.) 
 
Pro-Business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.) 
 
0.210 **  
 
(0.07) 
 
0.211 **  
 
(0.07) 
Total campaign contrib. ($10K) -0.111 * (0.05) -0.124 ** (0.05) 
 
Non-partisan judicial election 
 
-0.150 
 
(0.35) 
 
-0.249 
 
(0.34) 
Partisan election 0.775 * (0.38) 0.915 * (0.38) 
Justice w/in 2 years of term end -0.044 (0.15) -0.019 (0.15) 
Republican justice 0.712 ** (0.19) --- --- 
Democrat justice --- --- -0.846 ** (0.20) 
 
State tort climate 
 
-0.761 ** 
 
(0.23) 
 
-0.835 ** 
 
(0.23) 
State citizen ideology -0.002 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) 
State elite ideology -0.010 (0.01) -0.012 (0.01) 
 
Business litigant was petitioner 
 
-0.463 ** 
 
(0.10) 
 
-0.461 ** 
 
(0.10) 
Case strength 0.072 ** (0.00) 0.072 ** (0.00) 
 
Constant 
 
0.317 
 
(0.58) 
 
0.562 
 
(0.57) 
(N) 7,112  7,112  
     
NOTES: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  These 
models include all pro-business campaign contributions (logged) as a 
percentage of a justice’s total amount of campaign contributions (logged).  
All model specifications include state- and justice-level clusters. Mixed 
effects models estimated using the “meqrlogit” command in Stata (v.14.1).  
Model A includes the republican justice dummy variable; model B 
includes the democrat justice dummy variable. 
SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets. 
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Although my model specifications depart slightly from Shepherd’s,137 
results in Table 1 largely track Shepherd’s main findings presented in her 
2013 report.138  Shepherd’s analyses focus on the influence of pro-business 
campaign contributions and, having successfully largely replicated 
Shepherd’s core results, this paper extends Shepherd’s by turning to the 
possible influence of non- and anti-business campaign contributions on 
justices’ votes that favored non-business litigants. 
2. Non-Business Judicial Campaign Contributions 
Table 2 reports results after essentially “flipping” Shepherd’s basic 
model.  That is, where Table 1 reports results from models assessing the 
relation between pro-business judicial campaign contributions and the 
probability that a justice voted in favor of the business litigant, Table 2, by 
contrast, assesses the possible influence of non-business judicial campaign 
contributions on the likelihood that a justice voted in favor of the non-
business litigant. 
While a robust inference from Table 1 might induce an expectation for 
reciprocal findings in Table 2, results in Table 2 provide only partial 
support for such expectations.  Specifically, as it relates to the particular 
variable of interest, Table 2 illustrates that non-business judicial campaign 
contributions correlate with an increased likelihood of a judicial judge 
votes is present for both pro- and non-business settings, the influence is 
comparatively stronger for the pro-business setting. 
While analyses of pro- and non-business judicial campaign 
contributions’ efficacy in terms of influencing favorable judicial outcomes 
uncovers a few subtle differences, the overall weight of the results conveys 
a stronger sense of convergence.  For example, the relation between non-
business contributions and judge votes is just as pronounced for 
democratic and republican judges, though in the expected opposite 
directions.  Moreover, the case strength variable achieves statistical 
significance (and in the expected direction).139  Finally, the influence of a 
non-business interest petitioner significantly decreases the likelihood of a 
non-business vote.  As discussed previously, a similar finding emerges in 
the pro-business context and both may have more to do with a general 
“pro-affirmance” tilt in civil appellate litigation than with judicial 
campaign contributions. 
 
                                                
137 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 17. 
138 See id. (explaining Shepherd’s main findings). 
139 See infra Tables 2 & 3 (describing the underlying legal strength of a pro-business case 
became “stronger,” it reduced the probability of a judge vote favoring the non- [tbl.2] and 
anti-business [tbl.3] interest). 
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TABLE 2: MIXED EFFECTS MODEL OF NON-BUSINESS JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN 
CONTRIBUTIONS’ INFLUENCE ON JUDICIAL VOTING IN BUSINESS CASES 
(2010-2012) 
 
Judge vote favoring non-business litigant: 
(A)  
(s.e.) 
(B)  
(s.e.) 
 
Non-Business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.) 
 
0.088 *  
 
(0.04) 
 
0.090 * 
 
(0.04) 
Total campaign contrib. ($10K) -0.078 (0.04) -0.067 (0.04) 
 
Non-partisan judicial election 
 
-0.144 
 
(0.36) 
 
-0.038 
 
(0.35) 
Partisan election -0.834 * (0.38) -0.986 ** (0.38) 
Justice w/in 2 years of term end 0.080 (0.15) 0.054 (0.15) 
Republican justice -0.793 ** (0.19) --- --- 
Democrat justice --- --- 0.922 ** (0.20) 
 
State tort climate 
 
0.641 ** 
 
(0.24) 
 
0.721 ** 
 
(0.23) 
State citizen ideology 0.006 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) 
State elite ideology 0.011 (0.01) 0.012 (0.01) 
 
Non-business litigant was petitioner 
 
-0.468 ** 
 
(0.10) 
 
-0.466 ** 
 
(0.10) 
Case strength -0.072 ** (0.00) -0.072 ** (0.00) 
 
Constant 
 
-0.103 
 
(0.59) 
 
-0.391 
 
(0.57) 
(N) 7,112  7,112  
     
NOTES: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. These 
models include all non-business campaign contributions (logged) as a 
percentage of a justice’s total amount of campaign contributions (logged). 
All model specifications include state- and justice-level clusters. Mixed 
effects models estimated using the “meqrlogit” command in Stata (v.14.1).  
Non-business judicial campaign contributions include all contributions 
other than pro-business contributions.  Model A includes the republican 
justice dummy variable; model B includes the democrat justice dummy 
variable. 
SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets. 
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3. Anti-Business Judicial Campaign Contributions 
While judicial campaign contributions’ varied sources permit the 
identification of sources plausibly construed as “pro-business,” the 
construction of the non-business contributions do not, as Shepherd briefly 
notes, easily support a characterization of them as “anti-business.”140  
Rather, for interpretative purposes, results in Table 2 can only be 
understood (at least conservatively and cautiously) as “non-business.” A 
deeper understanding of whether judicial campaign contributions 
plausibly characterized as “anti-business” is possible only after 
constructing a new variable, which includes a sub-pool of non-business 
contributions limited to contributions from labor unions and democratic 
party campaign committees.  This alternative specification also provides 
something of a robustness check on the stability of the prior findings. 
As Table 3 illustrates, the main findings that emerge in Table 2 remain 
intact.  All of the variables that achieve statistical significance in the non-
business model retain their significance in the anti-business model.  
Importantly, the presence of judicial campaign contributions from anti-
business sources systematically correlate with an increased probability of 
a judge voting in favor of the non-business litigant.  And this finding 
emerges after controlling for the underlying legal strength of the case (as 
well as the independent influence of other control variables).  Similar to 
earlier findings, the influence of judicial campaign contributions on 
judicial outcomes achieves statistical significance only in the partisan 
election context.  Another factor that links Tables 1, 2, and 3 is the 
consistent salience of a party’s status as a petitioner.  Again, as previously 
discussed, it remains a distinct possibility that this variable is picking up 
a possible “affirmance bias” present in state supreme courts.  Finally, if 
nothing else, that Table 3’s results essentially track those in Table 2 
conveys the overall findings’ stickiness and robustness to alternative 
model specifications. 
 
                                                
140 Cf. SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 16 (construing judicial campaign contributions as either 
“pro-business” or “anti-business”). 
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TABLE 3: MIXED EFFECTS MODEL OF ANTI-BUSINESS JUDICIAL 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS’ INFLUENCE ON JUDICIAL VOTING 
IN BUSINESS CASES (2010-2012) 
 
Judge vote favoring non-business litigant: 
 
(A) 
 
(s.e.) 
 
(B) 
 
(s.e.) 
 
Anti-Business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.) 
 
0.129 *  
 
(0.06) 
 
0.142 *  
 
(0.06) 
Total campaign contrib. ($10K) -0.024 (0.03) -0.014 (0.03) 
 
Non-partisan judicial election 
 
0.006 
 
(0.35) 
 
0.105 
 
(0.34) 
Partisan election -0.925 * (0.39) -1.080 ** (0.39) 
Justice w/in 2 years of term end 0.074 (0.15) 0.048 (0.15) 
Republican justice -0.729 ** (0.20) --- --- 
Democrat justice --- --- 0.878 ** (0.20) 
 
State tort climate 
 
0.775 ** 
 
(0.23) 
 
0.854 ** 
 
(0.23) 
State citizen ideology 0.004 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) 
State elite ideology 0.005 (0.01) 0.006 (0.01) 
 
Non-business litigant was petitioner 
 
-0.470 ** 
 
(0.10) 
 
-0.470 ** 
 
(0.10) 
Case strength -0.072 ** (0.00) -0.072 ** (0.00) 
 
Constant 
 
0.472 
 
(0.65) 
 
0.288 
 
(0.63) 
(N) 7,112  7,112  
     
NOTES: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. These 
models include anti-business campaign contributions (logged) as a 
percentage of a justice’s total amount of campaign contributions (logged). 
All model specifications include state- and justice-level clusters.  Mixed 
effects models estimated using the “meqrlogit” command in Stata (v.14.1).  
Anti-business judicial campaign contributions include funds from either 
labor unions or democratic party committees (or both). Model A includes 
the republican justice dummy variable; model B includes the democrat 
justice dummy variable. 
SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets. 
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C. Discussion 
Results from Table 1, independently and in conjunction with prior 
empirical work, provide support for those worried about the potentially 
distorting influence of judicial campaign contributions from pro-business 
interests on judicial outcomes.141  Indeed, similar findings from her own 
related analyses prompted Professor Shepherd to characterize pro-
business judicial campaign contributions’ role as “destructive.”142  And 
Shepherd’s normative conclusions are echoed by others.143 
Equally important as the findings on the influence of pro-business 
judicial campaign contributions (Table 1) are findings of similar influences 
achieved by non- and anti-business contributions (Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively).  Expanding and building upon Shepherd’s earlier work 
reveals that Shepherd’s analyses (and conclusions) speak to only one piece 
of a more complex judicial campaign contribution puzzle.  The pieces 
provided by my additional analyses complicate Shepherd’s normative 
implications as well as prevailing wisdom.  Specifically, results from 
Tables 2 and 3 can certainly be understood to either exacerbate or reduce 
worries about business’ potential undue influence.  On the one hand, the 
new findings may only deepen fears about elected state supreme court 
justice decisions’ vulnerability to campaign contributions.  After all, the 
weight of the results from Table 1, 2, and 3 imply that the ability to 
influence judicial votes extends far beyond pro-business efforts. 
On the other hand, results illustrating that non- and anti-business 
interests’ campaign contributions influenced judicial outcomes similar to 
pro-business contributions may also, paradoxically, reduce overall 
worries about the relation between judicial contributions and outcomes.  
That is to say, evidence that any interest group willing and able to invest 
in judicial campaigns can influence judicial outcomes might dilute fears 
about the undue influence of any one particular group.  While one may 
reasonably feel uneasy about the influence of judicial campaign 
contributions on judicial outcomes, perhaps some comfort flows from the 
realization that any such influence is not limited to one particular 
viewpoint (e.g., pro-business interests).  Of course, it bears emphasis that 
evidence of positive relations between pro-, non-, and anti-business 
sources and favorable does not establish causation.  Indeed, in this 
particular context, a critical question that endures due to research design 
and data limitations involves whether such evidence reflects selection or 
                                                
141 See infra Table 1 (describing the mixed effects model of pro-business judicial campaign 
contributions’ influence on judicial voting in business cases). 
142 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 2. 
143 See, e.g., Charles G. Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 46–47 (2003) 
(explaining the finding that pro-business campaign contributions are destructive). 
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inducement effects.  That is, to take one example, the positive correlation 
between pro-business campaign contributions to judicial candidates may 
be a function of such contributions making it easier for pro-business 
candidates to win their judicial elections or, in contrast, inducing winning 
judges to reach pro-business outcomes.144 
Important causal inference limitations notwithstanding, at the very 
least what my results accomplish at an empirical level is to help place 
Shepherd’s critique of businesses’ influence on state supreme courts into 
a broader interpretative context and expand on what we know about the 
influence of judicial campaign contributions and judicial outcomes.  At a 
normative level, one implication from my results is that while Shepherd’s 
characterization of judicial campaign contributions as “destructive”145 
may still be apt, other vantage points may inject greater complexity and 
granularity and, in so doing, persuasively frame alternative 
characterizations of judicial campaign contributions that fall somewhere 
between positions staked out by Professors Shepherd, on the one hand, 
and Hall on another.146 
1. From the Empirical to the Normative 
Broadening the empirical debate to include evidence of the potential 
influence of extra-legal factors on judicial outcomes from any campaign 
contributor (pro-, non-, or anti-business) might help deflect the debate 
from a focus on narrow empirical points to the more theoretical (and 
decidedly non-empirical) question about whether, in the context of 
campaign finance and free speech, judicial elections are different in kind 
from non-judicial elections and, as such, whether they warrant different 
legal treatment when it comes to campaign finance.147  Within this still-
developing normative debate, two factors deserve attention.  One is that 
even if one concedes the empirical point that pro-business contributions 
do not have any monopolistic lock on helping secure favorable judicial 
outcomes, non-business judicial contributions’ distinctive focus may 
engender a similarly distinctive level of influence.  A second factor 
involves questions about whether legal doctrine, specifically laws 
                                                
144 See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts: 
The Empirical Relationship between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making, 
44 J. LEGAL STUD. S161, S178 (2015) (observing Kang & Shepherd note a similar limitation to 
their work as well). 
145 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 2. 
146 Compare SHEPHERD, supra note 103, with HALL, supra note 20. 
147 See King & Shepherd, supra note 144, at S165 (observing that campaign spending has 
increased dramatically and with it judicial elections have grown more competitive). 
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governing public election campaign contributions, should treat judicial 
elections differently than non-judicial elections. 
2. Pro-Business Contributions Overwhelm Non- and Anti-Business 
Contributions 
Even if one concedes that pro-, non-, and anti-business judicial 
campaign contributions all possess the ability to influence favorable 
judicial outcomes, it is plausible that the magnitude and nature of pro-
business contributions make them comparatively more efficacious and, 
thus, more worrisome.  Business interests and lawyers (and law firms) 
dominate financial contributions to state supreme court judges’ election 
campaigns.148  Between 2000–09, business interests, broadly defined, 
contributed more than $62.6 million, or thirty percent of all judicial 
campaign contributions.149  Lawyers and lobbyists (principally plaintiff 
lawyers and their agents) contributed $59.3 million, or another twenty-
eight percent of total judicial campaign contributions.150  By contrast, 
political campaign contributions to judges from unions are a small fraction 
as compared to the donations from either business interests or lawyers 
and lobbyists.151 
Not only do campaign contributions from business interests exceed 
those from all other discrete interest groups, but business interests’ legal 
agendas are typically more focused and benefit from a clearer idea of 
which judicial candidates business interests wish to target.152  Legal (and 
political) agendas advanced by lawyers and lobbyists, by contrast, are 
typically far less focused and more diverse, reflecting the various interests 
of a wide range of clients.153 
On balance, business interests, through their campaign contributions, 
are perhaps uniquely positioned to successfully exert influence of state 
supreme court judges, particularly when these judges are called upon to 
decide business cases.  If so, pro-business contributions, as Kang and 
                                                
148 See id. at S168–69 (discussing how campaign contributions from business interests result 
in state supreme court judges favoring business litigants across a range of cases). 
149 See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 1–2. 
150 See id. 
151 Cf. David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 306 (2008) (noting 
that unions are small but formidable contributors in the judicial election process). 
152 See id. at 297 (stating that contributions from business interests are often more 
substantial because these entities have more resources).  See also id. at 306 (noting that 
businesses have very narrow litigation interests, and thus, judicial candidates give deference 
to these interests when businesses contribute to candidates judicial campaigns). 
153 Cf. id. at 321 (discussing how lobbyists seeking judicial reform often advance 
stakeholder interests). 
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Shepherd emphasize, may indeed pose a special threat to a collective goal 
for fair and impartial justice. 
3. When it Comes to the First Amendment Are Judicial Elections Simply 
Different Than Other Elections? 
Arguments abound about whether the judicial and traditional 
political electoral contexts differ enough to warrant treating the judicial 
campaign finance context differently than the non-judicial campaign 
finance context.154  Hall, for example, argues that whatever differences 
might exist they are insufficient to justify different legal treatment for the 
judicial and non-judicial elections when it comes to campaign finance.155  
Others, however, emphasize the differences between judicial and non-
judicial elections and call for different campaign finance rules.156  
Professor Shepherd, for example, argues that judicial campaigns are 
particularly vulnerable to distortion (and implicitly distinct from non-
judicial elections) due to pro-business campaign contributions’ unique 
role in judicial elections.157 
Others share Kang and Shepherd’s conclusion but not their reasoning.  
Professor Sample, for example, emphasizes the public’s different 
democratic expectations for the courts and legislative branches and 
concludes that these differing expectations justify treating judicial and 
legislative campaign finance with different legal rules.158  Professor Smith 
similarly dwells on differences between the judicial and legislative 
branches and notes that judicial elections can involve spending by 
“specific litigants” or “specific cases” despite a public commitment to an 
“impartial adjudicator.159  Smith contrasts the judicial context with the 
legislative where, he notes, the public expects legislators to “(generally, at 
                                                
154 See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 144, at S164 (contrasting how reformers desired to 
insulate judges from political and other pressures because judges were appointed to restrain 
both the executive and legislative branches of government, however, a majority of states 
adopted judicial elections). 
155 See generally HALL, supra note 20. 
156 See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 144, at S176–78 (arguing that the rules for judicial and 
non-judicial elections should differ because ideology and campaign contributions heavily 
influence judicial decision-making). 
157 See id. at S167 (discussing how campaign contributions from business interests result in 
state supreme court justices favoring business litigants across a range of cases). 
158 See Sample, supra note 21, at 756–57 (opining that campaign contributions in judicial 
elections should be treated differently than campaign contributions in other elections). 
159 See Adam Liptak et al., Caperton and the Courts: Did the Floodgates Open?, 18 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 496 (2015) (stating that judicial elections differ from legislative 
elections in that they focus on impartial adjudicators making decisions for specific litigants 
and specific cases unlike legislative elections where the decisions of legislatures are guided 
by what voters want). 
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least) achieve the goals that the people who elected them wanted them to 
do.”160 
Apart from scholars’ perspectives, even some Supreme Court justices 
appear to tilt in this direction.  Writing for the Court in Williams-Yulee v. 
Florida Bar, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that: “[j]udges are not politicians, 
even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot.”161  Consequently, 
in a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld a restriction on election speech and 
fundraising for elected judges that would be “obviously” unconstitutional 
if applied to other candidates for elected public office.162  However, the 
Court’s Williams-Yulee decision stands quite uneasily with the Court’s 
prior decision in White which struck down a Minnesota law prohibiting 
state judicial candidates from making public statements concerning 
disputed legal or political issues incident to judicial campaigns.163 
Somewhat lost in the debate is the possible analytical purchase of a 
distinction between using judicial campaign contributions to “buy” a 
judicial vote as opposed to a judicial philosophy or general outlook.  
Again, all surely agree that a campaign contribution that, quite literally, 
pre-secures a specific judicial vote in a particular case—or even creates an 
objectively unacceptable impression of judicial impropriety or bias—as 
the Court’s decision in Caperton suggests, requires judicial recusal.164 
4. Efforts to Purchase a Judicial Philosophy Rather Than a Judicial 
Outcome 
More difficult, however, are judicial campaign contributions that do 
not seek to pre-secure a specific judicial outcome in particular case in the 
future but, instead, seek to promote a judicial philosophy, theory, or 
outlook.  If judicial campaign contributions in state elections simply reflect 
support for a particular or general judicial philosophy, they quickly begin 
to resemble the (albeit indirect) role that campaign contributions to 
presidential candidates perform in federal election context. 
While constitutional structure provides layers of separation between 
the electorate and a federal judge or Supreme Court Justice’s appointment, 
few serious observers contest the role that politics plays when it comes to 
the selection of Article III judges and Justices.  Indeed, in many ways our 
constitutional structure (to say nothing of political accountability) is 
                                                
160 See id. 
161 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015). 
162 Id. 
163 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2546 (2002) (holding that it is 
impermissible for states to regulate or restrain candidate speech based on its content). 
164 Cf. Pozen, supra note 151, at 303 (suggesting that the recusal system should be more 
rigorous). 
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designed to afford politics some role.165  Once one concedes, either as a 
descriptive or normative (or both) matter, politics’ role in the selection of 
federal judges, it logically follows that campaign contributions exert some 
influence, even if indirect. 
While the academic literature is festooned with research illustrating 
the role of politics, particularly presidential politics, in federal judicial 
appointments,166 a brief description of two recent (and still-evolving) 
examples deserve brief mention.167  First, Justice Scalia’s recent death 
presaged a political firestorm fueled by President Obama’s decision to 
appoint Judge Merrick Garland to fill the vacant Supreme Court seat.168  
(Now-former) President Obama’s status as a lame-duck, Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnelly’s assertion that the Senate would simply not 
process any Supreme Court nominations so close to a presidential 
election, and Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton’s refusal to 
commit to re-appointing Judge Garland if she assumed the presidency 
contributed to the political intrigue.169  As Professor Maltz recently noted, 
the Garland nomination serves “as a graphic reminder of the influence of 
presidential politics on the evolution of constitutional doctrine.”170 
Judge Garland’s nomination by a lame-duck president within one 
year of a contested presidential election only heighted the electorate’s 
attention to one likely outcome of the 2016 presidential election:  [t]he 
                                                
165 See id. (identifying various democratic benefits flowing from voters directly selecting 
state judges). 
166 See TERRI PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 122 (1999) (explaining how 
presidents can gauge future judicial performance by carefully evaluating the political views 
of potential nominees); JOHN MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 4 (1995) 
(stating that the Senate has the authority to either confirm or reject presidential judicial 
nominees); STEPHEN CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS:  CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 70 (1994) (analyzing how the current process of selecting Supreme 
Court Justices has become heavily political, which starkly contrasts how executive 
administrations before the 1980s selected potential Justices). 
167 See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (describing how presidential politics 
heavily influence the nomination and appointment of Supreme Court Justices). 
168 See Jonathan Adler, The Real Reason President Obama Won’t Recess-Appoint Merrick 
Garland to the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, (Dec. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/29/the-real-
reason-president-obama-wont-recess-appoint-merrick-garland-to-the-supreme-court/?utm 
_term=.8be1cf3660b8 [https://perma.cc/X7VB-5ZWY] (discussing how President Obama 
nominated Judge Merrick Garland to fill the late Justice Scalia’s Supreme Court seat). 
169 See id. (stating that the Senate is not constitutionally obligated to consider nominees 
appointed by the president). 
170 Earl Maltz, The 2016 Election and the Future of Constitutional Law:  The Lessons of 1968, 43 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 735, 735 (2016). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Judicial Politics and 
Decisionmaking: A New Approach, 70 VAND. L. REV. 2051, 2051 (2017) (experimental evidence 
suggesting that judges are not “politicians in robes”). 
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guarantee of one Supreme Court nomination and the not-implausible 
opportunity for additional nominations.171 
And this latter observation leads to a second (albeit related) 
example.172  During the recent presidential campaign, then-candidate 
Trump publicly released two separate lists of individuals (totaling twenty-
one) whom he proclaimed during a televised presidential candidate 
debate he would consider nominating to the United States Supreme 
Court.173  Given the perception that the next U.S. president would likely 
be in a position to fill at least one seat (by definition) and, more probably, 
two or more seats, and that the next president would likely have a 
significant influence on the development of future U.S. law, as Professor 
Kidd et al. note:  “[i]t is not surprising that Republicans wanted assurances 
that their nominee would nominate someone whose jurisprudence would 
match that of Scalia.”174  That is to say, then-candidate Trump (as well as 
his opponent, Secretary Clinton), took pains to inform the electorate 
throughout their campaigns about the “type” of judges and Justices they 
planned to nominate if elected.175  Moreover, both campaigns overtly ran 
campaign ads (negative and positive) and sought (and received) 
campaign contributions expressly over the issue of their approach toward 
judicial selections.176  Finally, not only did the two main presidential 
candidates perceive (almost assuredly correctly) the need for (or strategic 
political advantage of) discussing with the electorate what they would 
look for in the potential judicial nominees, but the mainstream media 
                                                
171 See id. at 736 (inferring that the president’s nomination extends beyond simply 
appointing one Justice because both Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg are approaching the 
age of retirement). 
172 See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (suggesting that the 2016 presidential 
election results would influence the judiciary for years to come because the next president 
would likely appoint multiple Justices to the Supreme Court). 
173 See Ed Whelan, Trump’s Supreme Court Candidates, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 9, 2016), 
www.nationalreview.com/node/442036/print [https://perma.cc/PQ2D-2T4W] (listing 
president-elect Trump’s twenty-one potential Supreme Court nominees). 
174 See Maltz, supra note 170 (discussing why a democratic president would choose a 
nominee who would side with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, whereas a 
republican president would choose a nominee who would side with Justices Roberts, 
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy for years to come). 
175 See Jonathan Adler, How Scalia-esque Will Donald Trump’s Supreme Court Nominee Be?, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/ 
wp/2017/01/26/how-scalia-esque-will-donald-trumps-supreme-court-nominee-be/?utm_ 
term=.7331ad04d232 [https://perma.cc/2P8F-F3M2] (discussing president-elect Trump’s 
plan to appoint judges very much in the mold of Justice Scalia). 
176 Cf. NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL 
COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 174 (Stanford Univ. Press 2005) (arguing that presidential 
candidates have historically made the selection of justices and judges a campaign issue). 
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reinforced the perception that the candidates’ approaches toward judicial 
nominations were a legitimate and, indeed, important campaign issue.177 
Very few at the time voiced any concerns with the presidential 
candidates’ open, consistent, and persistent discussion during the 
campaign of what they would “look for” in their judicial nominees.178  If 
anything, the opposite was the case.179  That is, the candidates, media, and, 
likely, a sizable portion of the electorate, felt that such discussions were an 
important part of the presidential campaign.180  To be sure, what 
happened during the most recent presidential election cycle (and similar 
to many prior election cycles) involved action by those seeking positions 
in the executive branch that possess the authority to nominate judges and 
Justices—rather than those who aspired to Article III commissions.181  This 
is, of course, an important distinction.182  Distinction aside, however, one 
question that endures is whether this constitutes enough of a distinction 
to treat constitutional issues embedded in campaign finance laws 
differently for state judicial elections and federal elections.183 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
To the extent that any campaign contribution in judicial elections 
facilitates “buying” justice, an array of obvious problems arise.184  Because 
pro-, non-, and anti-business have demonstrated some (albeit slightly 
                                                
177 Cf. Conor Friedersdorf, How a Hilary Clinton Presidency Would Affect the Supreme Court, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/how-a-
hillary-clinton-presidency-would-affect-the-supreme-court/501539/ 
[https://perma.cc/B2K9-K34U] (illustrating the importance of the Supreme Court 
nomination process).  See also Jim DeMint, DeMint: Gorsuch is a Model for Future Judicial 
Nominations, THE HILL (Apr. 12, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-
judiciary/328518-demint-gorsuch-is-a-model-for-future-judicial-nominations 
[https://perma.cc/9383-9SWC] (inferring that president-elect Trump made his intentions to 
nominate a certain type of Supreme Court candidate known to voters well in advance). 
178 See id. (interpreting that voters were satisfied because they were able to essentially vote 
for judicial candidates). 
179 See id. (arguing that Supreme Court nominations are an important election issue). 
180 Cf. Friedersdorf, supra note 177 (observing that discussions about Supreme Court 
nominations are necessary and important). 
181 See Vicki Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence:  The Selection and Tenure of Article III 
Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 977 (2007). 
182 See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (explaining how business and political 
party interests systematically influence judicial nominations, appointments, and decision-
making). 
183 Cf. Pozen, supra note 151, at 323 (suggesting that a change may be in the best interest of 
voters and the judiciary). 
184 Cf. Pamela Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1046 (2007) (discussing how 
judicial campaign contributions make judges beholden to the economic interests of donors 
and result in judges placing higher value on self-preservation as opposed to justice). 
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different) systematic ability to influence judicial votes in business cases, 
then, at the very least, one less problem emerges.  While this one less 
problem may not assuage some (or any) critics of pro-business campaign 
contributions in judicial elections, it nonetheless remains important to 
gain a full empirical picture before proceeding to contested normative and 
theoretical issues incident to assessing First Amendment protection for 
campaign contributions to judicial elections. 
Additional empirical clarity on the relations between campaign 
contributions and judicial votes, while helpful, does not, however, reduce 
the difficulty of the related, and enduring, normative questions.  To the 
extent that this issue uncovers an inevitable collision of important values, 
what remains is how best to reconcile these conflicting interests,185 and a 
single way to reconcile these conflicts may not exist.  As Professor Karlan 
notes, “it is not categorically true that we want judges to ignore popular 
opinion and rely on their own consciences, or that we want to protect 
judges who ignore politically settled interpretations and rely on their own 
views of the law.  Sometimes we do and sometimes we don’t.”186  Given 
this structural ambivalence, when it comes to narrower issues concerning 
judicial campaign contributions, the late-Justice Scalia likely got it right 
when he opined during the oral argument in White that:  “[n]ow, [judicial 
elections] may be a very bad idea, but as long as [the First Amendment is] 
in your constitution, I find it hard to believe that it is a significant State 
interest of Minnesota to prevent [judicial] elections from being 
informed.”187 
 
                                                
185 Cf. id. (concluding that solving the problems created by judicial campaigns can be 
solved by recapturing impartial justice and the rule of law). 
186 Karlan, supra note 184, at 1048. 
187 Brief for Petitioner at 45, Republican Party of Minn. V. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 
01-521). 
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APPENDIX TABLE A1 
 Mean s.d. (N) 
 
Pro-business judge vote 
 
0.50 
 
(0.50) 
 
10,804 
Anti-business judge vote 0.50 (0.50) 10,804 
Business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.) (raw) 19.32 (22.59) 10,607 
Non-business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.) 
(raw) 
59.15 (37.19) 10,607 
Anti-business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.) 
(raw) 
3.54 (13.54) 10,607 
Total campaign contrib. ($10K) (raw) 40.91 (61.35) 10,607 
Non-partisan judicial election 0.41 (0.49) 16,083 
Partisan election 0.18 (0.39) 16,083 
Democrat justice 0.42 (0.49) 16,083 
Republican justice 0.46 (0.50) 16,083 
State tort climate -0.13 (0.46) 16,078 
State citizen ideology 55.93 (14.66) 16,078 
State elite ideology 49.33 (13.62) 16,078 
Business litigant was petitioner 0.49 (0.50) 16,083 
Justice w/in 2 years of term end 0.24 (0.42) 16,083 
Case strength 
 
-0.02 (43.13) 7,112 
SOURCES:  Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets. 
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